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Abstract 
Radioactive materials have become an explicit target for criminal and terror-
ist organizations in recent years, as they can be effective tools for panic and 
serious economic damage generation when used in a variety of weapons (e.g. 
explosive devices capable of dispersing radioactive material). In addition, ra-
dioactive material has been used in several cases to commit crimes such as 
poisoning or radiation exposure to potential target persons. The most famous 
is the so-called ‘Litvinenko case’, in which a Russian intelligence officer was 
poisoned with polonium in 2006. In addition to the international cases, how-
ever, radioactive material is also found in Hungary time-to-time during home 
searches. Even the detection of these materials can be challenging in the ab-
sence of appropriate detection equipment. Their exact identification, collec-
tion and specific examination requires specialized expertise. If the crime scene 
personnel does not detect the presence of radioactivity at the scene in a timely 
manner (e.g, because it cannot be detected without measuring equipment), the 
persons working there may subsequently suffer serious damage to health, as 
well as large areas and objects can be contaminated by dispersed radioactive 
material. It can also cause serious economic damage. This article describes an 
operating procedure for the professional respond of crime scenes contaminat-
ed with radioactive material, developed by experts of the Hungarian National 
Police, National Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Forensics Department and 
radiologists at the Centre for Energy Research in the frame of a project support-
ed by the Home Affairs Security Fund.
1   This work was supported by the Hungarian Ministry of Interior and the European Union in the frame 
of the Internal Security Fund of Hungary [BBA 5.3.3/3-2017-00010].
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Introduction
Radioactive materials have become an explicit target for criminal and terrorist 
organizations in recent years, as they can be used in various type of weapons 
(such as radiological dispersal devices) resulting effective panic and serious eco-
nomic damage. In addition, they can be also used in other criminal cases, such 
as poisoning and radiation exposure of potential target persons or groups. One 
of the most famous criminal events is the so-called ‘Litvinenko case’ (Owen, 
2016, 1-328.), in which a Russian intelligence officer was poisoned with polo-
nium in 2006. Illicit trafficking and smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive 
materials is a real existing problem worldwide. The International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) collects in a database (Incident and Trafficking Database, 
ITDB) unusual events and incidents related to radiological materials (such as 
theft, loss, misuse of radioactive material, etc.) from around the world (URL1). 
Nearly 3.600 cases have occurred in the last 30 years following ITDB data only 
from officially reported events (Fig. 1.).
Fig. 1: Incident number connected to radioactive materials at the ITDB database of the IAEA 
(URL1)
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The severity of the problem is also shown by the fact that major international 
organizations such as the IAEA, the Nuclear Forensics International Techni-
cal Working Group (ITWG) or the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terror-
ism (GICNT) place great emphasis on this area in major international forums 
such as Nuclear Security Summits (URL2). They seek to raise awareness of 
the threat and consequences of nuclear terrorism because increasing terrorism 
results in growing chance to have different nuclear security events like a ra-
diological terror attack or other possibilities for different type of radiological 
crime scenes. Discovery of these materials at a scene can be challenging. Ra-
dioactivity is hardly detectable in the absence of appropriate measuring instru-
ments. Although certain signs may indicate the presence of radioactive material, 
such as radiation symbol (i.e. trefoil), lead containers, manipulators, radiation 
measuring equipment, dosimeters, glove bags, etc. if they can be found. Be-
sides, the precise identification, collection, professional transport, handling and 
examination of these materials, especially nuclear materials, requires special 
expertise and procedures. Particular attention needs to be paid to the fact, that 
radioactive material may not be presented at a scene in a well-separated, closed 
or packaged form, like in a plastic bag or container, but may also be as a con-
tamination on various surfaces such as floor, tables or clothing. It also means 
that the radioactive material can contaminate the crime scene personnel and the 
conventional evidence like fingerprints, DNA or material residues. Therefore, 
investigation of such a crime scene requires very special preparedness, rules, 
and procedures. An important issue is the personal safety (radiation protection) 
of crime scene personnel and the special security and safety rules for collection, 
transport and subsequent investigation of radiological materials and radioac-
tively contaminated conventional forensic evidences. In most countries, two 
methods are generally used to process radiological crime scenes (i.e. Radio-
logical Crime Scene Management, RCSM). More common is that the locali-
zation and collection of radioactive materials are carried out by police officers 
(crime scene investigators), because a civilian - even a radiation expert – must 
not enter the scene. The onsite work is assisted by a radiation protection expert, 
but he/she can give advice to the team only from outside of the hazard control 
area. The currently available general guideline written together by the IAEA 
and Interpol (IAEA, 2014, 1-93.) is also based on this approach and propos-
es appropriate action accordingly. The other possibility is that the radioactive 
material is considered to be merely a potential source of hazard, therefore a ra-
diation expert or team of experts will first remove it from the scene and then 
begins to investigate the crime scene traditionally. The first case is questiona-
ble, because crime scene personnel is not always trained to measure and collect 
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radioactive materials properly. They often have no experience and practice in 
doing it. Besides, in some cases the situation can be so complicated that only 
an experienced scientific expert can evaluate the information correctly onsite. 
Lack of expertise can become a source of danger and failures.
The second case is absolutely justified from the safety and health point of 
view but can cause problems in the prosecution process. Following this second 
method, the scene is basically changed before it is recorded, and the radiation 
expert can erase evidences that could otherwise have been preserved. Further-
more, radioactive materials can also be evidences or potentially even the main 
evidence in a criminal case, therefore it is necessary to ensure chain-of-custody 
and handling them as evidence for forensics examination. Possibilities depend 
on the type of situation. In some cases, if e.g. the level of radiation significant-
ly exceeds the background level, then the primary aim is the protection of hu-
man life. However, if the situation allows and does not pose an increased health 
risk, the protection of the crime scene personnel and the professional collection 
of radioactive materials can be carried out simultaneously. Nowadays, nuclear 
and other radioactive materials are being detected at more and more places in 
Hungary during home searches and in other different criminal cases. Therefore, 
Hungary has placed more emphasis on developing procedures for radiologi-
cal crime scene management. In the last 2 years, in a project supported by the 
Home Affairs Security Fund conventional and nuclear forensic experts have 
developed a procedure to handle a crime scene which contains or is contaminat-
ed with nuclear or other radioactive material. The main goal was to develop a 
harmonized procedure with the cooperation of crime scene investigators of the 
Hungarian Police and radiation experts of the Centre for Energy Research. The 
work was focusing on some key points like how to work together at a radiolog-
ical crime scene, how to establish the safety of the crime scene personnel and 
in between how to preserve the scene and the evidence during collecting radi-
ological materials and ensure nuclear forensics (IAEA, 2015, 1-62.) already at 
the scene. The aim of the project was to develop a procedure where each actor 
performs his or her own task in which he or she has practice and experience, in 
such a way that serves best the purposes of safety and the criminal investigation. 
The procedure based on the fact that the Hungarian laws allow special experts 
to be involved in onsite work if necessary. In addition, our activity is based on 
Government Decree 490/2015 (XII.30.) On ‘notifications and measures relat-
ed to lost, found and seized nuclear and other radioactive materials, as well as 
measures following other notifications related to nuclear and other radioactive 
materials’, which also requires an on-site inspection with the participation of 
the Centre for Energy Research for found and seized nuclear material (URL3). 
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The integration of the procedure developed into the national strategy will be due 
in connection with the forthcoming National Nuclear Security Response Plan 
when it enters into force. The Response Plan is under construction by leading 
of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority in cooperation with all the relevant 
stakeholders connected to response nuclear security events in Hungary. Until 
the final version of the Response Plan, the procedure is based on the regulation 
allowing the involvement of experts in special cases during crime scene inves-
tigation (100/2018. (VI. 8.) Government Decree, URL4).
Special characteristics of radiological crime scenes
The presence of radioactivity at a crime scene changes completely most con-
ventional crime scene investigation procedures, because it justifies/requires the 
introduction of special rules (e.g. use of special personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and the involvement of a radiological assessor or radiation protection ex-
pert. This can basically affect commonly used crime scene investigation proce-
dures. Three basic parameters need to be considered, which are related to radi-
ation protection rules and clearly change the course of the site: ‘time, distance 
and shielding’ (IAEA, 2014, 1-93.). It means, crime scene personnel should 
minimize the time spent onsite and near to radioactive objects. During the in-
vestigation, the crime scene personnel should stay away from contaminated 
objects as far as possible. These actions may require the use of tools, like ma-
nipulators, spacers, or even robots. At higher radiation levels, onsite workers 
must protect themselves from radiation using so-called shielding, like lead vest 
or lead walls. Furthermore, there are more differences at a radiological scene: 
• Any work in radiation field and contaminated areas needs the use of special 
personal protective equipment (PPE) like chemical resistant, closed cover-
all, double or triple layer of gloves, respirator, electronic personal dosimeter, 
etc. Moving and manipulating in PPE is uncomfortable, making movement, 
vision, hearing, and communication very difficult.
• Hazard control area should be established and marked out considering doses 
and weather conditions, like wind direction (IAEA, 2014, 1-93.).
• Scene control should follow even stricter rules, like log the personal doses 
absorbed by crime scene personnel during the onsite work.
In general, during the initial site survey radiological hotspots should be identi-
fied and marked. Removing the radioactive objects from the site has absolute 
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priority in order to reduce the risk (IAEA, 2014, 1-93.). Removing hotspots 
changes the original scene, therefore, the importance of pre-recording of the 
scene (photographing, filming) is even more emphasized. In addition, the ra-
diation level measured onsite determines the time crime scene personnel can 
spend inside and can modify the structured search strategies. It is important to 
be aware that radioactive material may be present at any scene, e.g. in an old 
device, removed from a disassembled improperly destroyed device. As already 
mentioned, radioactive radiation cannot be detected by normal sensory organs, 
only by using special devices, radiation detectors. Therefore, it is important 
to know what kind of signs can be expected at a radiological scene that can 
reveal the presence of radiation if a measuring device is not available. Really 
dangerous radiation sources with high radioactivity are in most cases of very 
small size (1-2 cm), but the protection built around them (radiation shielding) 
is mostly extensive. This is why radiation shielding devices (enclosures, spe-
cial protection) are easier to detect. These are mostly special containers made 
of very heavy metals (e.g. lead). Discovery of such objects at a scene warns of 
the presence of possible radioactivity.
Some possible signs can show the presence of radiation at a crime scene (Fig. 2):
• radiation symbol (trefoil)
• manipulators, spacers, tweezers
• many rubber gloves, glove bags, coveralls, lab coats, masks
• scattered white crystalline material, including chemical devices, metal cans, 
rubber gloves
• presence of radiation measuring devices
• typical instruments and equipment containing radioactive materials: e.g. ir-
radiation equipment, smoke detectors, containers
• typical documents: quality certificates, delivery note, official certificate, 
codes describing nuclear material, transport document, markings on the 
packaging of the boxes
• Unexplained, spotted burns to persons, animals connected to the scene.
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Fig. 2: Some objects at a crime scene which can indicate the presence of radioactivity (1. glove 
box; 2. tweezers; 3. gloves, masks; 4. radiation detectors; 5. manipulators; 6. radiation symbol 
and special shipping containers)
Method developed
The Hungarian RCSM procedure is based mainly on the international guideline 
(IAEA, 2014, 1-93.) but it differs slightly due to adapting it to national special-
ities. There are some unique characteristics in the Hungarian procedure which 
are based on what the Hungarian legal system allows. In our procedure, in a 
unique way, police officers and radiation experts work together at the crime 
scene. Helping each other, all actors can perform his or her own tasks in which 
he or she has practice and experience. For this purpose, crime scene investiga-
tor team members are in our case: 
Onsite team (inside the hazard control area, Fig. 3.):
• Searcher (primary evidence collector): a person who detects radiation, local-
izes and collects radioactive materials (radiation expert, i.e. an expert who 
is able to recognize, detect and professionally handle radiological materials)
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• Documenter (assistant evidence collector): a person responsible for onsite 
documentation and assisting in the collection of materials and packaging 
(police officer)
• Photographer (police officer)
• Onsite team leader: a scientific expert (radiation expert) whose primary 
task is to coordinate the onsite work of the team from the point of view of 
radiation (warns of emergencies, monitors instrumental detection and col-
lection, warns of places that have not been inspected, maintains continuous 
communication with radiation protection experts and crime scene manager, 
helps to determine the order of collection of material and preserve evidence) 
Offsite team (in the secured area):
• Scene entry person (radiation protection expert): a person in a ‘clean sta-
tion’ at the entrance of the hazard control area, assists the team’s work by 
providing clean equipment, changing gloves, measuring the contamination 
on the PPE of personnel leaving the area, receiving the collected evidence, 
continuously communicating with the evidence custodians and decontam-
ination unit
• Evidence Custodians: take evidences, place them into official evidence col-
lection bag with labelling, measure and record doses, ensure chain-of-cus-
tody (police officer), as well as perform gamma spectrometric analysis to 
categorize the material onsite for nuclear forensics purposes (gamma spec-
trometry expert)
• Crime Scene Manager: continuously communicates on-line (through head 
cameras and radio communication) with the onsite crime scene team.
• Backup team: to change crime scene personnel after working time have 
elapsed, calculated by the radiation protection expert.
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Fig. 3: Onsite team at the crime scene (hazard control area)
Elements of the radiological crime scene management can be seen in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Elements of the Radiological Crime Scene Management
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Preparation phase includes the establishment of perimeters, first radiation sur-
vey, instrument calibration and determination of background radiation level. 
Besides, the establishment of clean areas, exit and entry corridors, covering 
corridors with plastic foil (outside the crime scene area) to avoid possible con-
tamination of equipment and personnel by radionuclides after leaving the scene. 
Determination of level of hazard, type of PPE and time which can be spent at 
the scene inside. Besides, establishment of decontamination and evidence cus-
todian station. A very important part is the zone control: dose logging absorbed 
by the personnel working inside the hazard control area. Further key elements 
are the briefing and detailed planning. All team members need to be aware of 
their own tasks very clearly. Without detailed planning and knowing clear tasks 
unexpected situations can cause failures and accidents during the radiological 
crime scene investigation. During the initial radiation survey, level of radiation 
is measured at the scene using telescopic dose meter (remote measurement). In 
addition, a camera can be attached to the telescopic system to pre-map/record 
the scene for detailed planning of the procedure. After evaluating the situation, 
determination of PPE and worktime and detailed planning of investigation the 
next step is the first entry to the scene. The radiation expert (searcher) enters 
first and checks surface contamination and possible hazards. Searcher is close-
ly followed by a police officer who is responsible for recording the scene as 
first essential step. It can be carried out by taking photos and video recording, 
as well as using 3D laser imaging system. In the latter case, a special attention 
must be paid to possible contamination of the instrument. Use of drones is gen-
erally not recommended because the airflow can disperse radioactive contam-
ination at the scene causing air contamination. 
Highly suggested to follow a track in one direction by the team on a contam-
ination-free area if possible. In the case of large-scale surface contamination 
use of anti-contamination stepping plates can be required at the scene (Fig. 5).
During the detection of hotspots (radiation search), radioactive materials are 
localized and identified by special instruments. Radioactive materials as evi-
dences should be indicated by special evidence marking plates (with radiation 
symbol, see in Fig. 6). Material should be handled like conventional evidences 
(taking photos with marking plate and number, metric scale, instrument screen 
with dose and identified isotope, etc.). 
Next step is the collection of radiological materials. The location of all radio-
active material found, their dose and the identified isotope should be marked 
on the sketch of scene map. The team leader (radiation expert) in continuous 
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Fig. 5: Pathway during surface contamination mapping and dose measurement
Fig. 6: Detection and marking of radioactive material 
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communication with the crime scene manager will decide on the order of col-
lection, taking into account the situation (level of measured doses, location of 
materials, contamination and prevention of conventional evidences). Materials 
are collected with the assistance of two people: the primary evidence collec-
tor and the assistant evidence collector. Using long tweezers or manipulators, 
the material is placed by the radiation expert in a bag with a pre-opened and 
unwrapped mouth, which is kept by the assistant evidence collector (Fig. 7). 
Thereafter, the assistant person seals the bag, being careful not to touch its inner 
surface. Then he/she places the bag in a second, clean plastic bag together with 
the filled evidence label which contains information on dose, isotope, location 
of material and the trefoil symbol. Second bag is also sealed and handed out 
to the scene entry person who checks the surface contamination on the bag us-
ing swipe material analysing it by surface contamination monitoring device. If 
the bag is clean, it will be placed in the official evidence collection bag sealed, 
labelled to ensure chain-of-custody (Fig. 8) and transferred to dose measure-
ments, as well as gamma-spectrometric analysis. Finally, it will be located in 
the interim secured storage container. If the bag surface is contaminated with 
radionuclides, it should be placed in a third, clean bag, seal, and check surface 
contamination again. Contamination on the second bag surface should be in-
dicated in the label. 
It is very important to change the top layer of gloves between collection of 
each radioactive material to avoid radionuclide cross-contamination of sam-
ples collected (contamination means here: ‘radionuclides on surfaces or with-
in solids, liquids or gases (including the human body), where their presence is 
unintended or undesirable’ (IAEA, 2014, 1-93.).
It is also necessary to take a sample of the surface contamination at the scene 
as evidence for further examination. It can be done by swiping, swabbing, or 
using a spatula or pipettes depending on the form and phase of the material. In 
the case of solid samples, it is highly suggested to use wet swab instead of dry 
wipe material to avoid contamination of crime scene personnel and air contami-
nation. During collection of contaminating material from surfaces, conventional 
evidences (like fingerprints) must be taken into account due to the fact that they 
can be easily destroyed during this operation. Before swiping for sampling or 
decontamination of contaminated surfaces, it can be suggested to use forensics 
lights to check the surface for latent prints or DNA. Collection and in-field or 
laboratory-based examination of these radiologically contaminated evidences 
in simpler cases can be carried out i.e. they can be preserved and used for the 
investigation. Contaminated surfaces at the scene should be marked as they 
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Fig. 7: Packaging of radiological evidence
Fig. 8: Ensuring chain-of-custody (right)
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could be a potential source of hazard. Following the collection and elimination 
of all radioactive material, crime scene manager will decide whether these sur-
faces can be decontaminated or treated another way during the conventional 
crime scene investigation (e.g. taping with plastic foil and covering with lead 
plates). Another special rule is that any closed boxes, containers, or packages 
with radiation symbol or just showing radiation found at the scene must not be 
opened there. They should be transported to the nuclear forensics laboratory 
and opened there under safe conditions for further examination. Preliminary 
X-Ray analysis is also often required before opening. The final step is the fol-
low-up radiation survey, leaving and release the scene for conventional crime 
scene investigation. After collection of all radioactive hotspots, radiation expert 
should check the scene once again for any presence of radiation. All locations 
of hotspots should be checked again with the isotope identifier and surface con-
tamination monitor. If only background radiation level can be measured and no 
contaminated area available, the scene can be released for conventional crime 
scene investigation. Since radioactive materials are also handled as evidence, 
the numbering of conventional evidences is continuous.
Fig. 9: Special procedures for undressing of PPE (1. radionuclide contamination control on the 
surface, 2. opening of the safety coverall, 3. removing of the coverall by another person who 
touches only the inner surface of it, 4. careful removing of gloves, 5. step out to the clean area, 
6. careful removing of the respirator using plastic bag)
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During leaving the scene, crime scene personnel, PPE and all equipment used 
inside should be checked for any surface contamination. Removing of PPE 
should follow special rules to avoid any contamination of crime scene person-
nel causing any radiation hazard, like incorporation (Fig. 9).
The final important point that should be mentioned is the nuclear forensics which 
always starts at the scene with the first in-field identification and categorization 
of radioactive materials. It is a key activity of further operations like safe interim 
storage at the scene and special transport of radioactive materials, as well as in-
forming the nuclear forensic laboratory. To know the type and amount of radio-
active material is essential for the laboratory for proper preparation of receiving 
and examination of radiological evidences. It can have essential importance in 
such urgent cases like a dirty bomb explosion or prevention of a second event.
Conclusions
In this article, the Hungarian operating procedure for radiological crime scene 
management was presented which is based on international trends, guidelines 
(IAEA, 2014, 1-93.) and adapted to the Hungarian legal system and experiences. 
The procedure has been developed in collaboration with the staff of the Crim-
inal Forensics Department of the Hungarian Police and the Nuclear Forensics 
Laboratory of the Centre for Energy Research in Hungary. The main goal was 
to establish a harmonized common procedure in which each actor (convention-
al and nuclear forensic experts) performs his or her own task in which he or she 
has practice and experience, all in such a way that best serves safety and the 
purposes of the criminal investigation. There are some unique characteristics in 
the Hungarian RCSM procedure like in our case police officers and radiation/
nuclear forensic experts work together at the crime scene. Besides, our onsite 
team leader is a scientist, a radiation expert who helps the teamwork person-
ally inside according to the radiological aspects in continuous communication 
with the crime scene manager. We put great emphasis on detailed contamina-
tion control (surfaces, PPE, personnel, evidences, etc.) and therefore, e.g. on 
special rules for packaging and undressing procedure because we find radio-
active contamination as the highest source of hazard. Even only some radio-
active particles can cause problem if they can get into the human body. By our 
experiences, to avoid particle contamination needs to follow very special and 
accurate contamination control. For this reason, we decided that the clean area 
for preliminary storing of collected evidences and clean tools should be estab-
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lished outside the border of the hazard control area and never inside (except 
the scene is very large). In our procedure a radiation protection expert helps 
the teamwork from the clean area by giving in/taking out devices and assisting 
in glove changing, as well as contamination control. The operating procedure 
was tested and practiced during field exercises of different type of scenarios. 
The aim was to establish a harmonized and practiced procedure that can be used 
successfully and safely in a variety of complex real-life situations. The proce-
dure was presented in February 2020 at the request of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, at its headquarters in Vienna, as a side event in the frame of the 
International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS, 2020), see in Fig. 10. 
Further developments on this procedure involving international observers and 
more partner authorities in Hungary is in progress. In addition, implementation 
of various research programs, e.g. in-field and laboratory-based analysis of ra-
dioactively contaminated conventional forensic evidences (such as fingerprints, 
DNA and material residues) has been started in cooperation with the Hungarian 
Police and the Centre for Energy Research.
Fig. 10: Presentation of the Hungarian Radiological Crime Scene Management Procedure in 
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